Explained : The bureaucratization of politics and the political dynamics of bureaucratization within the Indian Administrative Service and Its Impact

Federalism implies a distribution of power between a central government and regional bodies, which promotes collaboration and cooperation. It highlights the necessity of an administrative framework for effective governance, emphasizing the need for a permanent, impartial bureaucratic body to implement policies. Bureaucratic competence is vital for sustaining political legitimacy and achieving public welfare, making the relationship and power dynamics between central and regional governments crucial for fulfilling national objectives.

The Indian Civil Services, established during the British colonial era, have been the foundation of India’s administrative framework and governance. To protect British imperial interests, these services were a crucial tool for maintaining order, collecting revenue, and executing policy during the colonial era. In 1800, Lord Wellesley, the Governor General of India, emphasized the necessity of educating recruits for the East India Company’s Civil Service. This choice emerged as the company’s function transitioned from commerce to encompass revenue collection, diplomacy, and military responsibilities. Civil servants, still referred to by commercial titles like Writers and Merchants, had shifted from purely commercial roles to political, judicial, and financial responsibilities, necessitating specialized training for their new functions. In 1853, the Indian Civil Service became competitive and merit-based, with the Macaulay Committee promoting attendance at approved universities. By 1958, the establishment of a National Academy for training indicated a shift towards more structured training, despite lingering colonial practices. Post-independence, colonial training practices persisted, such as assigning trainees to magistrates. T. S. R. Subramaniam (Bureaucrat and former Cabinet Secretary of India) noted that he learned more from practical experience than from formal training at LBSNAA. Since then, IAS training has evolved to focus on socio-economic development, reflecting India’s changing governance needs.

India’s federal governance is characterized by a constitutional balance between the central and state governments, with political dynamics often overshadowing constitutional principles due to electoral demands. The Indian Administrative Service (IAS) retains features from the colonial Indian Civil Service (ICS), such as being a generalist service with merit-based selection that places inexperienced individuals in key roles. The constitution reflects a unitary bias with centralizing elements including single citizenship, a unified judiciary, and extensive emergency powers, leading to a tension between centrally appointed officers and state politicians. This framework allows the central government significant influence over state matters, exacerbated by provisions like Article 312 of the Indian Constitution which enables the creation of all-India services seen as a federal anomaly. Myron Weiner had opined that the existence of these services “results in heightened tension between the centrally appointed officers and the state politicians who often resent the very effort of these officers to resist their pressures”. Over the years, these provisions regarding centre-state relations have been instrumental in providing the central government with a strong influence and dominance over the states.

The IAS, often known as India’s “steel frame” responsible for running all significant government departments at the state and federal levels, and hence has the authority to influence the implementation of a variety of policies that may have an impact on macroeconomic outcomes. Bureaucratic effectiveness is especially crucial in developing economies. Indeed, many rising countries have recently implemented social and economic reform initiatives targeted at fostering structural change, with the potential to significantly enhance living standards. The ultimate success or failure of these programs is largely dependent on how they are implemented in the field. Bureaucrats play an important role throughout this time. However, despite their importance to development and poverty reduction, the factors influencing bureaucrat effectiveness are rarely examined. This is largely due to India’s patronage-based political system, in which politicians manage the civil service to promote their personal and ideological aims.

During the Nehruvian era, the relationship between the central government and states was relatively non-confrontational, but shifted under Indira Gandhi, who centralised power and frequently imposed President’s rule, undermining participative governance. The late 1960s saw a shift from neutrality to a demand for bureaucratic commitment to the ruling party’s vision, leading to the politicization of bureaucracy. This period gave rise to the ‘yes minister’ syndrome, blurring lines between commitment to public welfare and loyalty to political agendas, resulting in a bureaucratic culture marked by subservience, where civil servants became accomplices to the ruling elite and corrupt alliances.

Since the advent of one-party domination in 2014, the bureaucratic capacity and independence as a permanent executive body have become entangled in the push and pull of central and state government responsibilities. The governing faction’s authority and command over non-conforming state governments, as well as the bureaucratic networks linked to the web of federal governance, is not without opposition. Sub-national policy networks, localized expertise in policy fields, and regionally entrenched interest groups, along with constitutional safeguards, make the centre-state tussle in intergovernmental relations a difficult battle. While centre-state interactions have always been subject to political upheaval, the key challenge remains the bureaucracy’s ability to avoid political demands while maintaining executive efficiency.

The IAS of today is hampered by several concomitant issues: a decline in the quality of recruits, political interference, perverse incentives for career advancement, a lack of specialized expertise, and a perception of widespread corruption. These infirmities have compromised the ability of the IAS to fulfil its mandate. This intersection of bureaucracy and politics imposes a burden on taxpayers, who ultimately bear the financial responsibility. In 2017, India allocated 10.18 trillion rupees ($125 billion) for the salaries, pensions, and allowances of government employees, representing 8.15% of the GDP. This expenditure exceeds the allocations for education, health, and defence; however, performance expectations remain unfulfilled.

Infrastructure and public service failures underscore bureaucratic inefficiency. The collapse of bridges, airport catastrophes, derailed trains, and leaks of examination papers illustrate these deficiencies. The Indian bureaucracy, intended to facilitate governance, has now transformed into a burden on taxpayers and an impediment to progress.

Singapore demonstrates an outstanding model of how a meticulously structured bureaucratic system can promote significant socio-economic progress and enhance the efficacy of public services. In 1995 Singapore government launched the Public Service for the 21th century initiative emphasizes innovation, quality, and employee welfare, along with decentralization that empowers departments and promotes accountability. Singapore’s competitive salaries for public servants, aligned with private sector standards, foster merit-based decision-making, reducing corruption. India is encouraged to adopt similar meritocratic and decentralized principles, invest in talent, and enforce anti-corruption measures to enhance its bureaucracy, shift towards transparency and responsiveness, and reflect a more efficient economic model. Without such reforms, inefficiency may persist and taxpayers will bear the consequences.

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