Explained: This article explains the political background, key decisions, and possible outcomes related to Explained : Stability at Home, a Predictable Partner for India and Its Impact and why it matters right now.
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Thailand’s snap general election on 8 February has delivered a clear political surprise, with the Bhumjaithai Party outperforming expectations and Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul swiftly claiming victory. By Monday, 9 February, with nearly 93 percent of ballots counted, the conservative party had surged well ahead of its rivals and was projected to secure 194 of the 500 seats in the House of Representatives — placing Anutin firmly at the centre of the next government formation process.
The results mark a setback for Thailand’s reformist forces. The People’s Party, which had led several pre-election opinion polls, finished a distant second with an estimated 116 seats, while Pheu Thai—associated with jailed former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his daughter, the recently removed premier Paetongtarn Shinawatra — trailed in third place with around 74 seats.
Thailand’s snap general election on 8 February has delivered a clear political surprise, with the Bhumjaithai Party outperforming expectations and Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul swiftly claiming victory.
Asked about coalition negotiations and cabinet appointments, Anutin struck a measured note, saying he would wait for the final tally before initiating talks, as parties first assess their internal positions. Framing the outcome as “a victory for all Thais”, he also signalled policy continuity, indicating that the incumbent ministers of finance, foreign affairs, and commerce are likely to retain their portfolios — suggesting stability rather than disruption as Thailand enters yet another phase of coalition-building.
The Coalition Calculus
Anutin has held the premiership only since September last year, having previously served in the cabinet of former PM Paetongtarn Shinawatra, who was removed from office following an ethics ruling linked to her handling of relations with Cambodia. Facing the prospect of a no-confidence motion, Anutin dissolved parliament within 100 days of taking office in December 2025 and called an early election. His campaign focused heavily on economic stimulus and national security, drawing on a surge of nationalist sentiment sparked by deadly clashes along the border with Cambodia.
Under Thailand’s electoral rules, once the official results are announced, the 500-member parliament must convene within 15 days to elect a prime minister, who requires at least 251 votes to secure the post. Parties that win a minimum of 25 seats may nominate prime ministerial candidates from lists submitted ahead of the election. If no nominee secures a majority, parliament will hold successive rounds of voting until a prime minister is elected, with no fixed deadline for concluding the process.
With the required endorsements within reach, Anutin is well placed to consolidate his leadership within a few days.
Bhumjaithai is therefore expected to turn to smaller parties to assemble a governing coalition. Among the potential allies is Kla Tham, led by Deputy Prime Minister Thammanat Prompao, which Thai media project will secure around 58 seats. The Kla Tham Party’s chief strategist, Anudit Nakornthap, stated on 9 February that the party is awaiting an invitation from Bhumjaithai to join a coalition government, stressing that the two parties could align without friction. The Thai Ruam Thai Party, with 5 constituency seats, has also expressed interest in joining the winning bloc. With the required endorsements within reach, Anutin is well placed to consolidate his leadership within a few days.
Reframing the Charter
In a first for Thailand, voters were asked not only to elect 500 members of the House of Representatives but also to decide whether to initiate the drafting of a new constitution. Each voter received three ballot papers: two for the parliamentary election and one for the constitutional referendum.
Thailand’s modern political history has been marked by a recurring cycle of military coups, street protests, and judicial interventions that have routinely curtailed elected governments. Since the end of absolute monarchy in 1932, the country has experienced more than a dozen successful coups, the most recent in 2014. That coup reshaped the political order through the 2017 constitution, drafted under military rule, which continues to frame — and constrain — Thailand’s democratic politics.
At the heart of this framework lies the appointed Senate. The 2017 constitution created a 250-member Senate, entirely appointed rather than elected, and empowered it to vote alongside the 500-member House of Representatives in selecting the prime minister. In effect, this meant that unelected senators could decisively influence — and even override — the popular will expressed through elections. Although the Senate’s role has evolved since the immediate post-coup period, its existence remains a powerful symbol of institutionalised elite oversight of electoral politics. This dynamic was evident in the aftermath of the 2023 elections.
The Move Forward Party, which won a landslide victory in 2023, was disbanded after Thailand’s Constitutional Court ruled that its pledge to amend Article 112 of the Criminal Code — the lèse-majesté law — amounted to an attempt to undermine the constitutional monarchy. Article 112, which criminalises defamation or insult of the monarchy and carries prison sentences of up to 15 years per offence, has long been among the most sensitive and politically charged issues in Thailand. Its interpretation and enforcement have frequently placed strict limits on political debate, particularly for progressive and youth-led movements.
Thai voters backed the proposal to change the constitution, with nearly two-thirds voting in favour of replacing the charter put in place after the 2014 military coup. This outcome grants the incoming parliament a mandate to begin a lengthy and multi-stage drafting process.
The People’s Party, which emerged after the Move Forward Party was dissolved, was acutely aware of these constraints. During the recent election campaign, it deliberately avoided placing Article 112 at the centre of its platform, instead focusing on economic issues, governance reform, and cost-of-living pressures. This retreat was not so much an ideological shift as a strategy of political survival.
Against this backdrop, the simultaneous holding of a national referendum alongside the general election was symbolically significant. For the first time, voters were asked directly whether they supported constitutional reform in principle. Thai voters backed the proposal to change the constitution, with nearly two-thirds voting in favour of replacing the charter put in place after the 2014 military coup. This outcome grants the incoming parliament a mandate to begin a lengthy and multi-stage drafting process. Two additional referendums will be required. While the vote does not guarantee immediate change, it offered citizens a rare opportunity to register dissatisfaction with a charter widely viewed as a legacy of military rule.
Anutin’s government may enjoy a stronger mandate than many of its predecessors, but unless the deeper constitutional imbalance between elected authority and entrenched institutional power is addressed, political stability is likely to remain contingent and fragile. The referendum, modest as it was, suggests that this debate is far from settled.
Implications for India
For India, Thailand’s latest election outcome matters less for personalities than for political direction. As a close partner in Southeast Asia and a key pillar of New Delhi’s Act East Policy, Thailand occupies a strategic space that links India’s eastern neighbourhood with the wider Indo-Pacific. Anutin Charnvirakul’s victory and the consolidation of conservative, stability-oriented politics in Bangkok, therefore, carry clear implications for India’s regional calculus.
New Delhi has consistently argued for an inclusive, multipolar Indo-Pacific rather than bloc-based politics. A Thailand that resists over-dependence on any single power strengthens that vision.
Frequent leadership changes and fragile coalitions can complicate sustained engagement on long-term initiatives. A government led by Anutin, with a relatively strong parliamentary position, is likely to prioritise continuity in foreign and economic policy. For India, which values stable interlocutors in ASEAN capitals, this creates space for steady diplomatic and security engagement rather than episodic, personality-driven ties.
Security cooperation is likely to remain a central pillar of the India–Thailand relationship. Thailand’s emphasis on national security and sovereignty aligns with India’s own concerns across its eastern flank, particularly in the Bay of Bengal and the broader Indo-Pacific. Bangkok’s tougher posture on border security and internal stability suggests it will continue to support regional mechanisms focused on counter-terrorism, cybersecurity, maritime security, and intelligence sharing. For New Delhi, this reinforces Thailand’s role as a pragmatic partner rather than an ideologically driven one.
Thailand’s position on Myanmar will be especially consequential for India. As a frontline state with deep economic, political, and humanitarian links to Myanmar, Bangkok has played an influential role in shaping ASEAN’s response to the crisis. Thailand has hosted and participated in ASEAN consultations on Myanmar, supported implementation of the bloc’s Five-Point Consensus, and emphasised dialogue and humanitarian assistance — reflecting its preference for a cautious, consensus-based regional response. Anutin’s government is expected to continue this cautious, stability-first approach centred on ASEAN processes. While this may frustrate advocates of stronger pressure on the Myanmar military, it broadly aligns with India’s own preference for calibrated engagement that balances security concerns, humanitarian assistance, and regional stability.
Connectivity remains another area of concern. Myanmar is central to India–Thailand connectivity, as large stretches of the India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway pass through its territory, making it the only land link between the two countries. The project’s viability hinges on Myanmar’s political and security stability. In response, both India and Thailand have stepped up engagement with Myanmar — Thailand through humanitarian outreach and sustained dialogue, and India through efforts to engage with stakeholders to safeguard connectivity projects — aiming to create conditions for the corridor to function as a viable trade and tourism route. Further delays, however, remain likely as instability persists following elections in Myanmar that brought the military junta’s proxies to power.
Economically, Thailand remains an important trade and investment partner for India. Within ASEAN, Thailand is India’s fourth-largest trading partner, following Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia. In FY 2025, the bilateral trade stood at US$19.07 billion. In April 2025, India and Thailand elevated ties to a Strategic Partnership, pledging to “realise the full potential” of economic cooperation. There is scope to expand cooperation in areas such as digital services, renewable energy, agro-processing, and tourism. However, India may need to calibrate its expectations: structural economic reform is unlikely to be a priority for a government focused on domestic stability, which could limit the pace of trade liberalisation.
For New Delhi, the outcome reinforces a familiar lesson in Southeast Asia: enduring partnerships are built not on electoral moments alone, but on sustained engagement amid political flux.
Within the Indo-Pacific strategic landscape, Thailand’s electoral outcome reinforces a broader Southeast Asian trend towards hedging rather than alignment. The incoming government is expected to maintain balanced relations with major powers, including China and the United States, while preserving ASEAN centrality. This approach resonates with India’s preference. New Delhi has consistently argued for an inclusive, multipolar Indo-Pacific rather than bloc-based politics. A Thailand that resists over-dependence on any single power strengthens that vision.
The challenge for India will be to convert this political continuity into concrete outcomes, particularly on connectivity and regional security, while remaining sensitive to Thailand’s domestic constraints and evolving democratic debate. For New Delhi, the outcome reinforces a familiar lesson in Southeast Asia: enduring partnerships are built not on electoral moments alone, but on sustained engagement amid political flux.
Sreeparna Banerjee is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation
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