Explained : Muslim Representation, Identity Politics, and the Structural Limits of Indian Democracy and Its Impact

India has decisively entered a phase of problematic communal politics that is steadily limiting its rational and intellectual foundations. The consequences are visible not only in electoral outcomes but also in the cultural and educational regression that accompanies this shift. The systematic delegitimisation of Urdu, falsely portrayed as a non-Indian or alien language, exemplifies this. Such politics is not merely unreceptive; it is retrogressive, signalling a retreat from apparently India’s composite cultural traditions.

Recent electoral outcomes underscore a deeper transformation. In Bihar and the recently concluded local body elections in Maharashtra, the commanding position of the ruling dispensation, particularly the Bharatiya Janata Party, contrasts sharply with the declining performance of non-communal parties such as the Indian National Congress, Nationalist Congress Party, and Samajwadi Party and others.

This decline cannot be explained merely by organisational weakness; it reflects a larger reconfiguration of political narratives under conditions of heightened communal polarisation.

One of the most significant shifts in this landscape is the rise of Muslim identity-based parties, particularly the All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen and the All India United Democratic Front. There is growing evidence that sections of the Muslim electorate are gravitating toward these parties, often viewing them as authentic representatives of Muslim grievances. However, this shift must be evaluated within the structural realities of India’s electoral system.

India follows the First-Past-The-Post system, not proportional representation. Muslims, unlike Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, have no constitutionally mandated political reservation. In such a system, identity-based parties with geographically concentrated support can only succeed in constituencies marked by extreme demographic ghettoisation.

Such constituencies are very few. Consequently, while AIMIM or AIUDF as political organisations may expand their visibility and bargaining power, this does not translate into a broader increase in Muslim political representation.

Empirical trends are instructive. In Bihar, Muslim MLAs declined from 19 to 11, a reduction closely coinciding with the electoral entry of AIMIM. At the national level, Muslim representation in the Lok Sabha has fallen drastically. from around 48–49 MPs in the 1980 general election to roughly 24 today. In Uttar Pradesh, Muslim MLAs numbered around 60 or more in the 2012 Assembly elections. The stated intention of AIMIM to contest the 2027 Uttar Pradesh elections aggressively raises legitimate concerns that opposition parties like the Samajwadi Party may be unable to consolidate Muslim votes, leading to a further contraction of Muslim legislative presence.

This fragmentation is not accidental. From a strategic standpoint, the ruling dispensation benefits from the political isolation of Muslims from non-communal parties.

A consolidated Muslim vote for AIMIM or AIUDF (or the like) in a First-Past-The-Post system ensures that these parties win only a handful of heavily concentrated seats, while the overall Muslim presence in legislatures diminishes. In effect, symbolic assertion replaces substantive representation.

At the same time, non-communal parties face a severe dilemma. They are attacked by the ruling establishment as “appeasers,” while simultaneously being accused by leaders like Asaduddin Owaisi of betraying Muslim interests.

Navigating between these pressures has become increasingly difficult, especially in an environment where the ruling party enjoys overwhelming material resources, institutional dominance, and organisational depth.

Muslim political behaviour today is shaped by genuine grievance. There is a widespread perception that non-communal (secular and socialist and the like) parties have failed to adequately address issues such as arbitrary arrests, delayed justice, discrimination, and socio-economic marginalisation.

The Honorable Prime Minister has successfully convinced large sections of the Hindu electorate that secular parties exist solely to appease Muslims, further shrinking the political space for inclusive politics.

The strategic conclusion remains unavoidable. In the absence of proportional representation, in the absence of political reservation, and given the fragmented demographic spread of Muslims across constituencies, identity-based Muslim parties are structurally incapable of securing meaningful representation for the community at large.

Their rise may strengthen party leaderships, but it weakens ordinary Muslims’ ability to negotiate power within broader political formations.

The priority for Muslims, cannot be emotional alignment or symbolic assertion alone. It must be the pragmatic expansion of Muslim MPs and MLAs across parties capable of winning power. Strengthening Muslim presence within non-communal parties remains the only viable route to sustained political relevance.

Blind allegiance to AIMIM or similar formations, however understandable as a reaction to marginalisation, risks further shrinking Muslim representation in legislatures.

The future of Muslim politics in India hinges not on identity consolidation but on strategic engagement. Without this realism, the community risks political isolation at precisely the moment when democratic safeguards are already under strain.

Amir Hussain is an academic Counsellor (Social Work & Political Science) IGNOU