Explained : From Political Agreement to Ratification and Coming into Force and Its Impact

India and the EU announced the political conclusion of a major Free Trade Agreement (FTA) at their bilateral summit in New Delhi at the end of January 2026. The full text of the FTA was published in late February. However, the summit announcement and publication only mark the conclusion of negotiations—when will the FTA be ratified and actually come into force?

We can reasonably expect the FTA to come into force early in 2027. This is because, while India has a notably straightforward ratification process for international agreements, the EU process will take approximately one year.

Ratification is the final step in the process of approving an agreement, by which the parties indicate their intention to be bound. Once ratification has been completed, an agreement can be concluded and formally enter into force.

We can reasonably expect the FTA to come into force early in 2027. This is because, while India has a notably straightforward ratification process for international agreements, the EU process will take approximately one year.

India ratifies trade agreements primarily through executive approval by the Union Cabinet rather than formal legislative ratification by Parliament. The process involves inter-ministerial consultations led by the Department of Commerce, approval from the Ministry of External Affairs for legal/political aspects, and final endorsement by the Cabinet before signing.

European ratification is more complex. Some previous EU trade agreements have been blocked at this stage: either dragging on for years or becoming de facto infeasible. The EU-Canada agreement (CETA), which was politically signed off on in 2016, is pending, with ten EU member countries still in the process of full ratification as of March 2026. Negotiations on the EU-Mercosur deal (a free trade agreement with the South American bloc of Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay) were politically concluded in late 2024, but as of March 2026, the agreement faces significant ratification hurdles that threaten to delay implementation: in January 2026, the European Parliament voted to refer the Mercosur agreement to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to rule on its legality with respect to environmental and consumer health policies, effectively pausing the approval process for up to two years.

The problems with the ratifications of CETA and the EU-Mercosur agreement are partly substantive and partly procedural. The main procedural problems will not apply to the India FTA, and the substantive concerns regarding investor-state dispute mechanisms and agricultural competition impacts on European farmers, which have hampered the other deals, do not apply in the India case.

It is useful to summarise the procedures that will apply to the EU’s ratification of the India FTA. And to assess whether substantive issues may arise that could lead to political difficulties within this process. 

Crucially, the FTA with India has been designed to be negotiated within the ‘exclusive competence’ of the EU’s institutions and their collective decision-making processes. This means that the India FTA will be ratified at the EU level through a process involving the European Commission, the Council, and the European Parliament, without requiring additional formal decisions from the national governments and parliaments of the EU member states.

It is useful to summarise the procedures that will apply to the EU’s ratification of the India FTA. And to assess whether substantive issues may arise that could lead to political difficulties within this process. 

The EU treaties allow for different types of agreements with third countries. ‘Mixed agreements’ that touch upon competencies which are shared between the EU institutions and the member states require approval at the EU level and also by all EU member states. This type of procedure has become increasingly challenging due to rising politicisation, protectionist concerns, and complex internal politics.

However, the EU can conclude agreements solely within its exclusive competence. In this case, the agreements are negotiated by the European Commission on the EU’s behalf, and the ratification procedures are set out in Article 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Exclusive competence agreements cover a wide range of issues, including trade (Article 207 TFEU), scientific and technological cooperation (Article 186 TFEU), visa waivers (Article 77(2) TFEU), and climate action (Article 192 TFEU). This is the process which applies to the India FTA.

An EU-exclusive process begins with the European Commission asking the Council, which represents the member states collectively, whether it can negotiate a trade agreement with a trading partner. The Commission then negotiates with the trading partner on behalf of the EU, based on the mandate given by the Council. Throughout the process, the Commission works closely with the Council’s trade policy committee. The Commission keeps the European Parliament fully informed and also holds meetings with civil society representatives. Once the Commission completes the negotiations, it presents the deal to the Council and the European Parliament. The Council then gives the Commission a mandate to sign the agreement.

Trade agreements of this kind also need Parliament’s approval before they can enter into force. For the Parliament, quality standards are often a red line in trade agreements, and any attempt to lower them could be grounds for rejecting a deal. Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) can ask the ECJ for an opinion on the legal basis underpinning a trade agreement, as they have for the Mercosur deal. The Parliament can also exercise a veto if there are serious concerns: for example, in 2012, MEPs rejected the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA).

Clearly, this exclusive process is much simpler – and shorter in duration – than going through 27 member-country processes, each of which follows different national constitutional rules, in addition to the EU-level process.

Normally, we can expect that the close consultation and coordination which has taken place between the Commission, member states, and the European Parliament during the FTA negotiations with India will mean that all the EU decision-making parties are in consensus at the moment of political conclusion. Thereafter, ratification should be a smooth ‘rubber stamp’ process, taking approximately one year.

What might be the caveats to this prospect of a smooth EU ratification process? Notably, the India FTA does not include significant deepening of agricultural market access or the introduction of investor-state dispute mechanisms, neither of which would have been acceptable to India. European stakeholders concerned about these issues will therefore be less concerned about the India FTA and are unlikely to mobilise opposition within the European Parliament or to lobby the Council intensely.

Normally, we can expect that the close consultation and coordination which has taken place between the Commission, member states, and the European Parliament during the FTA negotiations with India will mean that all the EU decision-making parties are in consensus at the moment of political conclusion. Thereafter, ratification should be a smooth ‘rubber stamp’ process, taking approximately one year.

However, the India FTA is a major agreement which contains other important substantive clauses. It has also been negotiated with notable speed: unlike the Mercosur agreement, for which negotiations dragged out over decades, its contents and the issue at stake have not necessarily been well understood by all European stakeholders during the negotiation phase. It is therefore possible that the publication of the texts may result in greater awareness among European interest groups and, consequently, a desire to engage with the ratification process, particularly in the European Parliament. This possibility is only hypothetical and unknown as of the date of writing.

One area where there might be some stakeholder and political concern in Europe about the India FTA is climate change. EU FTAs usually include strong chapters on Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD), but the India deal has a weaker provision, which is causing concern among environmentalists and the Green Group in Parliament. This means that parallel ongoing processes between the EU and India during the rest of the year may also be important to the ratification debate – in the case of climate change action, the New Delhi summit committed both parties to work on an MOU establishing “an EU-India platform for cooperation and support on climate action” which is to be launched in the first half of 2026.

Trade specialists are also likely to watch how the FTA may or may not influence India’s positions in the WTO, particularly on the question of the WTO Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement (IFD), and at the upcoming WTO Ministerial Conference (MC14), scheduled to take place from 26 to 29 March 2026 in Yaoundé, Cameroon.

These examples illustrate that FTA ratification will not be an isolated process: the FTA is now a foundational stone of a broader set of EU-India commitments and ongoing discussions. Anyone interested in the FTA should also read the joint vision document ‘Towards 2030: Joint EU-India Comprehensive Strategic Agenda’, which was adopted at the New Delhi summit. This Strategic Agenda aims to “deliver mutually beneficial, concrete and transformative outcomes for both partners and for the wider world”, and it repeatedly emphasises that building “prosperity and sustainability” is a combined goal.

Both the European Parliament and EUR-lex publish clear briefings about the EU’s FTA negotiation and ratification processes.

Overall, we should not worry greatly that engagement and scrutiny during the ratification process could derail the EU-India FTA. The EU institutions and civil society are committed to open and deliberative processes, which often result in lively debates, moments of challenge, and media headlines. However, this deliberative process also yields a sound overall understanding and a remarkably robust consensus on EU goals and interests. Having that consensus will be very valuable as the EU and India move forward to the next steps in their bilateral negotiations on an investment agreement.

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Jesse Scott is a Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, as well as adjunct faculty at the Hertie School in Berlin since 2019.

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