Explained : Bhadralok and Beyond: Competitive Communalism Reshaping Bengal’s Politics to the Detriment of Bengali Culture and Its Impact

Bengal is no stranger to communalism. History bears witness to the horrific clashes between Hindus and Muslims that divided Bengal into two, causing deep trauma that affected generations in both parts. Partition was seen as a solution in 1947, but it became a lingering wound that created new problems, including an influx of refugees. After 2018, the term “ghuspetiya” – used to describe illegal immigrants, especially from Bangladesh and more recently from Myanmar – is being used against the state, particularly by Bharatiya Janata Dal (BJP) leaders.

Yes, illegal border crossings in Bengal are an issue, as they are in other border states. Unlike Punjab, which saw a mass exodus during partition, Bengal experienced sporadic trickles that continue to this day. This sensitive issue still affects both India and Bangladesh, but ultimately, it’s a matter of international relations that requires compassionate and careful handling. Therefore, the irresponsible use of the term “ghuspetiya” to stir up the people of Bengal for electoral gain is dangerous, as it reopens old wounds and rekindles fears that once shook Bengal.

What is also distressing is the callous treatment of Bengali-speaking migrant workers, who, despite possessing valid identification such as Aadhaar and voter IDs, are subjected to mass raids across states like Gujarat, Maharashtra, Odisha, Madhya Pradesh and Delhi. They are falsely labeled as “illegal Bangladeshi immigrants” or “Rohingyas” and are forcibly deported to Bangladesh without any legal process or representation. The rising dominance of Hindi-language media, with its aggressive promotion of Hindutva nationalism, has shifted the national political landscape, intensifying fears about the marginalization of Bengali culture within India’s diverse national identity.

This has opened up a tricky space in Bengal for groups like Bangla Pokkho to indulge in nativist ethno-linguistic superiority, unwittingly setting off language wars that end up othering non-Bengali populations like Biharis, Marwaris and Punjabis who have lived in Bengal for generations. This trend, quietly celebrated among the bhadraloks, the refined upper-caste middle-class intelligentsia, reveals a dangerous paradox. In resisting Delhi’s Hindi-Hindu dominance, this group has ended up using exactly the same logic, repackaging the idea of Hindu India that speaks Hindi in Kolkata as the idea of one Bengal, with one language and one identity.

Under the slogan “Joy Bangla,” the ruling party, Trinamool Congress (TMC), is also slipping down the slippery slope of communal politics. It has chosen a dual approach of positioning itself as a protector against majoritarian aggression while courting Hindu voters through saffron symbolism, which is already, in a sense, the beginning of the silencing of Bengal’s plural soul, which was once deliberately and well intentionally constructed to bring about peace and stability in a tired, partition-torn Bengal.

A brief look at history reminds us of their crucial role in shaping not only which faction rose to power but also the socio-economic climate of the state.

The History of Colonial Communalism in Bengal

Examining historical details urges us to look beyond superficial, clichéd assumptions about partition – such as the belief that Bengal’s unity had to be sacrificed solely for all-India unity and that the partition was mainly driven by Muslim communalism. Joya Chatterji’s work, “Bengal Divided: Hindu Communalism and Partition, 1932-1947,” emphasizes the important role of the bhadralok in enabling the partition because of their apparent shift from ‘nationalism’ to ‘communalism.’

Her observation aligns with academician Partha Ghosh’s commentary that, starting in the mid-1800s, a significant rise in Hindu nationalist consciousness emerged in Bengal – something not yet seen elsewhere in British India. Bengal was the first region to be exposed to the English language and colonial-style education. James Mill’s “The History of British India,” which he had written without ever visiting India, divided Indian history into Hindu, Muslim and British periods based on dominant powers and religious identities – most likely due to ignorance, as it omitted the Buddhist period entirely – and the bhadraloks were quick to claim the Hindu Golden Age.

Bengali writers such as Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay, Ishwar Gupta and Girish Ghosh elevated Rajput and Maratha kings as heroes. Culture bequeathed to the fractious bhadralok a sense of communal identity. So much so that, “In the late thirties and forties, the bhadralok relied upon many different tactics to create the semblance of a united ‘Hindu’ polity, whether by the use of shuddhi (ritual purification) or ‘caste-consolidation’ programs, which sought to find a place for the lower castes and tribals in the Hindu community,” writes Chatterji.

Before becoming the focal point of the Indian national movement, Bengal started the Hindu Mela in 1867, an annual gathering of Hindus that became popular across British India. It was replicated in Lahore and Madras (now Chennai). This inspired Sir Syed Ahmed Khan to initiate the Aligarh movement in 1875, in which he advocated for Muslims to pursue Western-style education and scientific knowledge while maintaining their Islamic values. In one of his speeches, he said that the movement’s aim was to educate Muslims so they could compete with Hindus, especially Bengali Hindus.

The frequent use of Hindu imagery in the national movement, particularly the Swadeshi movement that started in 1905, further upset Muslims. As a result, in 1906, the All India Muslim League was founded in Dhaka to represent Muslim interests.

Noted historian Ayesha Jalal has pointed out how the ideas of both Muslim and Hindu nationalism largely resulted from British social engineering, which began as a project after the 1857 Mutiny. It started when the British introduced the idea of conducting a census. Emphasis was placed on the individual’s faith, and the census results were segmented more by religion than by economic or social status. Ultimately, both Muslim and Hindu nationalism were thus rooted in Britain’s colonial understanding of India.

What is interesting about the communalism we saw develop in Bengal, though, is that class conflict became intertwined with communal conflict. The changing political landscape from the 1920s onward, marked by increased democratization of organized politics through the Non-Cooperation Movement and later the Government of India Act 1935, along with the implementation of separate electorates via the 1932 Communal Award – which brought a Krishak Praja Party-Muslim League coalition to power in Bengal – threatened the prominence and influence of the bhadralok.

The 1932 award granted Muslims more seats than Hindus in Bengal’s legislature, reducing the bhadralok to a minority in the assembly they once expected to dominate. Muslims gradually gained ground in government jobs and educational control previously held by the Hindu bhadralok, who, also as landlords, rent-receivers and professionals, held dominant positions in a predominantly Muslim peasant society.

Faced with numerous forces challenging their privileges, the bhadralok elite shifted from inclusive anti-colonial nationalism to communal politics, driven by fear of losing their social, economic and political dominance. They redefined “Bengal” through a Hindu-centric perspective, cultivating a refined, elite form of communalism that significantly shaped the partition of the province. They eventually accepted help from the Hindu Mahasabha and the Bengal Congress to mount a campaign to partition Bengal in 1947.

Post-Independence Lull

The Partition plan clearly favored the bhadralok by offering a nationalist solution to the communal problem, leading to the migration of a substantial number of Muslims to East Pakistan. When the Left Front government took over West Bengal in 1977, it deliberately moved away from religion and other ascriptive identities such as caste and tribes, instead prioritizing a class-based approach. Their objective was to foster rural unity through land reforms and local governance.

Initiatives like Operation Barga were designed to transcend identity politics; however, critics argue that this approach failed to address the persistent discrimination against religious minorities. Despite subtle revelations such as those in the 2006 Sachar Committee Report that showed evidence that the Left Front had a political system that managed, but never truly resolved, the historical trauma and socio-economic marginalization of the minority, it is important to recognize that the Left Front administration successfully maintained control over communal extremism for three decades, demonstrating the effectiveness of their strategy. That changed once the Trinamool Congress (TMC) took control of the state.

Rise of Competitive Communalism

While TMC continued using the Muslim population as its electoral shield, it failed to address the core issues highlighted by the Sachar Committee Report. Instead of empowering Muslim communities with more jobs, better access to education or increased funding for entrepreneurial activities as recommended, the TMC government chose to align with the orthodox section of Bengali Muslims and appeal to their religious symbols, ignoring class-based issues. It also started providing monthly allowances to Muslim clerics.

TMC’s strategic courting of Muslims in the wrong way and for the wrong reasons allowed the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to criticize it for unfairly appeasing the community. As a result, TMC also began giving allowances to Hindu priests and increased financial grants for Durga Puja committees to counteract the criticism.

For a long time, the BJP lacked a strong foothold in the state despite having many Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) shakhas (branches) in Bengal as part of the Sangh Parivar. However, it saw this as an opportunity to attract the Matua faction – formerly Hindu refugees from Bangladesh – by leveraging its signature Hindutva politics. As the BJP’s presence in the state grew, with seats increasing from two to nineteen in the 2019 Lok Sabha elections, the environment began to change quickly.

The BJP started using events like Ram Navami and Hanuman Jayanti processions to rally Hindus in Bengal. To stay competitive, TMC included Ram Navami in its political strategy. Last year, the party declared a public holiday for the event – a first in Bengal’s history. The TMC government also allocated 250 crore from the state budget to build a replica of Odisha’s Jagannath Temple in Digha, which was inaugurated last year.

Competitive communalism in West Bengal has arisen as a powerful and disruptive political force, wherein the two primary parties – TMC and BJP – have strategically begun to exploit religious identities to garner votes. This perilous development shifts the political landscape towards divisive religious polarization, as both parties actively participate in aggressive identity politics that jeopardize social harmony and democratic integrity.

Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism

Meanwhile, new developments took place within the Muslim community in Bengal. The District of Murshidabad has become significant due to the radicalization of Islam and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the area. Political anthropologist Suman Nath, during his 2019 fieldwork in the Murshidabad Assembly constituency of Rejinagar, noticed posters calling for the rebuilding of Babri Masjid. He observes that Islamic politics in Bengal has been undergoing a ‘puritanical purification’.

Bengal has historically had a relatively open and syncretic form of Islam linked with Sufism and mystical traditions, blending core Islamic beliefs with local folk cultural practices and sometimes incorporating elements from other religions. It also highlights veneration at shrines and the celebration of saint anniversaries.

However, these traditions face challenges from Sharia Islam, which is increasing communal tensions within the Muslim community. This change is evident as supporters of Sharia Islam interpret the Quran and Hadith strictly and literally, converting Sufi mazars into prayer halls that focus on orthodoxy and a unified emotional approach for all Muslims. They are redefining what it means to be an ‘ideal Muslim’ and punishing those who diverge.

Humayun Kabir, a suspended TMC member, is directly appealing to this emerging radical group to rebuild the Babri Masjid as a way to legitimize this puritanical movement and challenge syncretic Islam, further heightening communal tensions in an already tense environment.

The Future of Bengal in the Hands of its People

For decades, Bengal’s political mobilization rested largely on class and welfare, with religion operating as a secondary identity marker. Even during earlier communal flare-ups, mainstream parties avoided sustained, competitive religious symbolism. But now the spiraling competitive communalism has undermined the foundations of the state.

“When temple-mosque politics moves from border districts to planned urban centers, it signals ambition, not spontaneity, political analyst Biswanath Chakraborty said, adding that it reflects an “attempt to normalize religious assertion as mainstream electoral language”.

Bengal, a border state born of Partition, bears the deep scars of refugee influx, demographic upheaval and episodic violence. Although it has never fully conformed to the Hindi heartland’s pattern of sustained religious polarization, these wounds remain vividly present and are highly susceptible to political manipulation. As political scientist Subhomoy Moitra emphasizes, “When economic hardship dominates everyday life, sudden ‘mandir-masjid’ politics signals a calculated narrative shift.” Whether this moment cements lasting division or dissolves under electoral pragmatism will not only determine individual political careers but could also define the very future fabric of Bengal’s political culture.

This story was first published in thewire.in and republished here with permission.

Sreya Sarkar is a public policy analyst based out of Boston. She is the author of the novel “Beneath the Veneer.”