Explained: This article explains the political background, key decisions, and possible outcomes related to Explained : Bangladesh-India Relations Are Back on the Brink – The Diplomat and Its Impact and why it matters right now.
The murder of Sharif Osman Bin Hadi, who had participated in the July Uprising, which resulted in the ouster of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s government, has triggered violent chaos in Bangladesh.
Hadi was a potential candidate in the upcoming parliamentary elections; he was expected to contest from the capital, Dhaka. He was known for his anti-India politics.
Hadi was shot in the head on December 12, and succumbed to his injuries on December 18. What was initially seen as a tragic incident of political violence in Bangladesh has, within days of the attack and especially with his death, morphed into something far more consequential. The incident took on regional connotations after allegations were leveled against Hasina’s Awami League and India.
The killing is said to have been carried out by an AL activist, who, according to rumors, has fled to India.
The attack on Hadi occurred a day after the Election Commission announced the schedule for the general elections.
News of Hadi’s death has triggered a wave of violent chaos in Bangladesh. On the night of December 18, an angry mob attacked the offices of Prothom Alo and The Daily Star, two of the country’s leading newspapers, known for their progressive and liberal editorial stance. The attackers destroyed property and engaged in arson.
They also vandalized Chhayanaut, a renowned cultural institution known for promoting Bengali music, culture, and tradition. The attackers claimed the institutions were linked to India and supportive of the ousted AL.
In Chittagong, protesters also demonstrated and threw stones at the office of the Indian Assistant High Commission, prompting police to intervene and disperse the crowd near the mission.
Targeting of India and India-related institutions has escalated over the past week. Hasnat Abdullah, a top leader of the National Citizen Party, a party that was recently formed by students who led the July Uprising, publicly stated on December 15 that if India did not stop sheltering AL leaders and those accused of attacking Hadi, Bangladesh would shelter separatists from Northeast India on its territory.
“If Bangladesh is destabilized, the fire of resistance will spread beyond borders. Since you are housing those who destabilize us, we will give refuge to the separatists of seven sisters too,” Abdullah said. The seven states of India’s Northeast are often referred to as the “seven sisters.” The region was historically roiled in insurgency and unrest, which has, by and large, been quelled.
“I want to say clearly to India that if you shelter forces who do not respect Bangladesh’s sovereignty, potential, voting rights and human rights, Bangladesh will respond,” Abdullah warned.
Hasina and several AL leaders in her government are said to be sheltering in India. Despite the interim government’s repeated request to India to extradite Hasina in the wake of her conviction and death penalty meted out to her by the Bangladesh International Crimes Tribunal, she remains in India.
Following Abdullah’s statement, India’s Ministry of External Affairs summoned Bangladesh’s High Commissioner on December 17 to lodge a formal protest over what it termed a provocative anti-India rhetoric and the emerging security issues related to Hadi’s shooting. Indian officials also pointed to threats and hostile discourse against the Indian High Commission in Dhaka, signaling that New Delhi saw the episode not just as isolated political noise in Bangladesh but as part of a general decline in the public and diplomatic environment.
The situation deteriorated further with a group of demonstrators announcing a march to the Indian High Commission in Dhaka. The demonstration called for the extradition of Sheikh Hasina and other suspects in crimes that include a series of murders during Hasina’s autocratic rule. They protested against what they call Indian-backed political interference in Bangladeshi politics.
Although the demonstration did not make it to the Indian High Commission — police blocked the protesters from entering the neighborhood — the march had the impact of worsening already frayed Bangladesh-India relations, especially as the public discourse in Bangladesh has grown increasingly aggressive.
Reacting to India’s statement calling for free, fair, inclusive, and credible elections, conducted in a peaceful atmosphere in Bangladesh, Bangladesh’s Foreign Affairs Adviser Md Touhid Hossain rejected Indian advice on Dhaka’s internal political and electoral processes, stressing that Bangladesh would handle its affairs independently.
Himanta Biswa Sarma, the chief minister of the Northeast Indian state of Assam, reacted strongly to Abdullah’s comments on the Northeast by warning of Indian retaliation to any attempt at dismembering India. “See, we have one Chicken’s Neck. But Bangladesh has two Chicken’s Necks. If Bangladesh attacks our Chicken’s Neck, we will attack both the Chicken’s Necks of Bangladesh … The Chicken’s Neck of Bangladesh, the one in Meghalaya connecting Chittagong port in Bangladesh, is even thinner than India’s Chicken’s Neck and is located just a stone’s throw away,” Sarma said, drawing attention to Bangladesh’s vulnerability.
Hadi’s political identity mattered. As a leader of the July Uprising, he is known for his anti-India politics. His murder was seen as a symbolic assault on the uprising. When there were allegations that the suspect had fled to India, public anger reached a critical point. Even without official confirmation, the rumor of Hadi’s assailant’s cross-border escape resonated deeply in Bangladesh, where matters of sovereignty and border sensitivity have always been emotional subjects.
India formally rejected the claim that its territory was used as a refuge and emphasized that it does not tolerate activities hostile to Bangladesh. However, the lack of visible joint communication or a coordinated investigative narrative allowed speculation to flourish. In an environment of low trust, political actors, social media commentators, and far-right activists filled the gap, hardening public opinion and narrowing diplomatic space on both sides.
India’s view of Bangladesh has been shaped considerably by the latter’s support to anti-India insurgents taking refuge on its soil. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, groups like the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) received shelter in Bangladesh, leaving a lasting imprint on Indian strategic memory. Over time, the group received more than mere refuge. The most significant evidence came in 2004, with the interception in Chittagong of ten truckloads of sophisticated weapons meant for ULFA.
The return of the AL to power in 2008 marked a turning point in Bangladesh-India relations. During Hasina’s tenure, Dhaka dismantled the camps and networks of anti-India insurgents in Bangladesh and handed over several top ULFA leaders to Indian authorities. The Delhi-Dhaka collaboration on security issues during Hasina’s rule prompted strong Indian support for her regime. The AL’s fall in August 2024 marked the end of that cooperation from Bangladesh.
While there is no indication that the interim government led by Muhammad Yunus intends to reverse security cooperation, rising bilateral distrust and periodic exchanges of hostile rhetoric, contrasted with growing warmth in Dhaka’s relations with Pakistan and China, have roiled India’s relations with post-Hasina Bangladesh.
Yunus’ remarks on India’s Northeast were made in the context of regional connectivity. But these were seen in New Delhi as provocative, especially in the context of the deteriorating security situation in India’s Northeast, especially in Manipur since 2023. For Delhi, amid its ongoing woes in the Northeast, any attempt of cross-border meddling emerging from Bangladesh is profoundly distressing.
Bangladesh’s meddling in Indian affairs is just rhetorical at this point. With the country nearing elections, anti-India talk has become an easy way for leaders to show strength and nationalism.
Delhi’s concern is not so much the anti-India rhetoric but the possibility that the upcoming political transition would lead to a loosening of the security cooperation that had kept India’s Northeast relatively stable for over a decade. The violence unfolding in Bangladesh does not bode well for relations between the two once close neighbors.