Case Explained: Restitution can’t be ordered for pre-MVRA crime, SCOTUS rules – Legal Perspective

A defendant could not be ordered to pay restitution for a crime committed before the enactment of Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court has decided.

The petitioner in the case, Holsey Ellingburg Jr., was convicted in 1996 for robbing a Missouri bank in December 1995. The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 became law on April 24, 1996.

Later in 1996, a judge sentenced Ellingburg to 322 months imprisonment and ordered the defendant to pay $7,567 in restitution pursuant to the MVRA. While incarcerated, Ellingburg paid $2,154 towards his obligation.

Following his release from prison, Ellingburg’s probation officer demanded that he pay monthly restitution of $100. According to the government, as of March 2023, Ellingburg owed $13,476 in restitution due to the MVRA’s interest and extended liability provisions.

Ellingburg responded by filing an action in Missouri federal court challenging the imposition of restitution, contending that the application of the MVRA to his pre-MVRA conduct violated the U.S. Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause.

Both the lower court and the 8th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected that argument. But the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, concluding MVRA restitution constitutes criminal punishment that triggers the Ex Post Facto Clause’s prohibition on retroactive laws.

Click here to read the full text of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Jan. 20 decision in Ellingburg v. United States.

BULLET POINTS: “Here, the statutory analysis is straightforward: Restitution under the MVRA is plainly criminal punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Numerous features of the MVRA lead to that conclusion. The MVRA labels restitution as a ‘penalty’ for a criminal ‘offense.’ A court may order restitution only with respect to a criminal ‘defendant’ and only after that defendant’s conviction of a qualifying crime. Restitution is imposed during ‘sentencing‘ for the offense. At the sentencing proceeding where restitution is ordered, the Government, not the victim, is the party adverse to the defendant. …

“Our ruling today does not mean that a restitution statute can never be civil. But the statutory text and structure of the MVRA demonstrate that restitution under that Act is criminal punishment.”

— Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh, opinion of the court

“I join the Court’s opinion in full because it correctly applies our precedent. I write separately to clarify the foundation of that precedent. This Court’s 1798 decision in Calder v. Bull, established that the Ex Post Facto Clauses forbid only those retroactive laws that impose ‘punishment’ for a ‘crime.’ Over the 228 years since Calder, the Court has struggled to articulate what it means for a law to impose punishment for a crime, and thus to be subject to the Ex Post Facto Clauses. The Court’s more recent precedents have implemented Calder through two multifactor tests that turn largely on whether the legislature labels the law as criminal or civil. But in 1798, ‘punishment’ for a ‘crime’ would have been understood to refer to any coercive penalty for a public wrong. Many laws that are nominally civil today would therefore have been subject to the Ex Post Facto Clauses under Calder. I would restore Calder‘s approach to the Ex Post Facto Clauses.”

— Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Neil M. Gorsuch, concurring