Case Explained: Terraforming Warfare and International Law – Legal Perspective

[Dr Saeed Bagheri is Lecturer (Assistant Professor) in International Law at the University of Reading School of Law. His research focuses on the law on the use of force and international humanitarian law.

Gerhard Kemp is Professor of Criminal Law at UWE Bristol in the United Kingdom, with his research focusing on international criminal law, comparative criminal law, and transitional justice.]

The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has recognised in its Policy on Addressing Environmental Damage Through the Rome Statute (which was launched in December 2025) that ecological damage can be a significant factor in the various ICC crimes (war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, and the crime of aggression). The challenge is to turn this acknowledgement into effective prosecutorial actions. As Maud Sarliève and Pauline Martini noted, the OTP Policy:

“represents a significant development in international criminal law (ICL), clarifying that environmental destruction may lead to criminal accountability for individuals, and not to merely regulatory sanctions or civil liability”.

International humanitarian law (IHL) and international criminal law (ICL) have long struggled to account for environmental destruction during armed conflict. Environmental harm has been doctrinally marginalised, treated as secondary to civilian casualties or property damage, and constrained by legal thresholds that are rarely operationalised in practice. At the same time, debates on “ecocide” and other ecocentric crimes remain largely prospective, with limited traction in existing accountability mechanisms. These limitations are starkly illustrated by the ongoing hostilities in Gaza, where environmental harm has reached levels that far exceed what international law typically treats as incidental collateral damage. Building on our recent article in the Journal of International Criminal Justice, this post presents a conceptually grounded assessment of the Gaza situation, relevant to similar cases of what we call “terraforming warfare” . We argue that the Gaza conflict exposes a critical accountability gap: international law lacks an adequate conceptual and legal framework for addressing systematic, landscape-altering environmental destruction as a method of warfare. To address this gap, we propose the concept of terraforming warfare, understood as forms of hostilities that intentionally transform the natural and built environment in ways that undermine long-term civilian life. While this anthropocentric (as opposed to ecocentric) framing can certainly be critiqued, we contend it is normatively defensible and realistic. Indeed, when properly interpreted, current IHL and ICL legal standards, especially those concerning war crimes related to environmental damage, are applicable to such conduct and ought to be enforced, even in the absence of a specific crime of ecocide. The OTP Policy on Environmental Crimes articulates this anthropocentric yet realistic view on how best to approach crimes that affect the environment and, by extension, human existence. The Policy recognises that environmental protection has inherent value. Regarding criminal liability for environmental harm, it states:

“There are significant synergies between the fight against impunity for international crimes and preventing environmental damage. Destroying, degrading, or polluting the natural environment will often directly impact humans, such as by causing people to be displaced, inflicting great suffering or injury on victims, or even causing death. If a causal link can be established between a perpetrator’s intentional actions and an objective element of a Rome Statute crime, those acts may constitute Rome Statute crimes both during armed conflict and in times of peace.”

We
submit that “terraforming warfare” is a particularly egregious form of
environmental destruction and firmly within the parameters of Rome Statute
crimes, and war crimes in particular.

Terraforming Warfare: Concept and Legal Relevance

We use
“terraforming” as a term borrowed from science fiction, typically used to
describe the artificial transformation of an environment to make it accessible
for settlement. The term ‘terraforming’ joins ‘terra’ (land) with ‘forming’,
the ‘making’ or ‘moulding’ of land, land-making. In the settler-colonial
projects described in Amitav Ghosh’s book
on the subject, the phenomenon of terraforming was ‘fundamentally conflictual;
it was a mode of warfare, of a distinctive kind’ (p. 55). In the context of
armed conflict, however, terraforming takes on a darker meaning: the
intentional transformation of an environment into one that is hostile to human
life. Terraforming warfare refers not to isolated attacks causing environmental
harm, but to patterns of destruction that reconfigure ecosystems,
infrastructure, and landscapes in ways that have enduring ecological and
humanitarian consequences.

Three
interrelated features
characterise terraforming warfare. First, it entails the systemic destruction
of environmental infrastructure essential to civilian survival, including water
networks, sewage systems, agricultural land, and energy facilities. Second, it
produces long-term ecological effects, such as soil degradation, pollution, and
biodiversity loss, that persist well beyond the cessation of hostilities.
Third, it alters the physical geography of civilian life, rendering areas
uninhabitable or incompatible with dignified existence.

The
situation in Gaza exemplifies these dynamics. The scale of bombardment, the
extensive use of heavy munitions in densely populated areas, and the
destruction of agricultural and water infrastructure have generated an
environmental crisis alongside the humanitarian one. Reports by UN
bodies and environmental experts
document widespread contamination, destruction of farmland, and the collapse of
ecosystems critical to food security and public health. The cumulative
effect is not merely damage, but transformation:
Gaza’s environment is being reshaped in ways that threaten the possibility of
civilian life itself.

Crucially,
terraforming warfare is not defined by intent to destroy the environment per
se. Rather, it captures situations where environmental destruction is either
deliberately pursued or knowingly accepted as a means of achieving military
objectives.

Environmental Protection under International Humanitarian Law

IHL
does contain specific provisions aimed at protecting the natural environment
during armed conflict. Articles 35(3) and 55(1) of Additional
Protocol I (API) to the 1949
Geneva Conventions prohibit methods and means of
warfare that cause “widespread, long-term and severe” damage to the natural
environment. Similar protections are reflected in customary international law
and in the ICRC’s Customary IHL Study (Rule
43 and Rule
45). However, these provisions have been
criticised for their vagueness and high thresholds, which limit their practical
utility. Notably, as
pointed out by Johansen, the controversial
nature of the provisions affords military commanders flexibility in deciding
whether to target a specific object, thereby raising questions about the scope
of environmental crimes under the Rome Statute (pp. 64-89). Yet, these
criticisms, while not unfounded, should not obscure the normative significance
of environmental protection in IHL. The prohibition on excessive environmental
damage is
grounded in the principle of humanity,
which underpins the entire law of armed conflict (pp. 79-80). Environmental
destruction matters not only because nature has intrinsic value, but because
the environment sustains civilian life. Where environmental harm undermines
access to water, food, shelter, and health, it directly implicates the core
humanitarian objectives of IHL.

The
interpretive challenge posed by terms such as “widespread,” “long-term,” and
“severe” should not be resolved in a manner that renders environmental
protections illusory. As the International Law Commission has emphasised in its
Draft
Principles on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts,
environmental considerations must be integrated into the application of
existing IHL rules, including the principles of distinction, proportionality,
and precautions in attack. Applied to Gaza, this framework raises serious
questions. Even when military objectives are present, the anticipated environmental
impacts of extended bombardment – such as
failures of water and sanitation infrastructure and land contamination – must
be incorporated into proportionality evaluations. Environmental damage is
intrinsically connected to civilian harm and cannot be considered
independently. Consequently, assertions of military necessity should be
thoroughly scrutinised when attacks could render civilian life impossible.

Accountability and the Limits of Anthropocentric Criminal Law

Despite
the normative recognition of environmental protection in IHL, accountability
mechanisms remain limited. The Rome Statute of the ICC does not include a
standalone crime of ecocide, notwithstanding growing
advocacy for its inclusion. Environmental harm is
instead addressed indirectly, primarily through Article 8(2)(b)(iv), which
criminalises attacks launched with knowledge that they will cause widespread,
long-term and severe damage to the natural environment that is clearly excessive
in relation to the anticipated military advantage. This provision mirrors the
high thresholds of API and has never been applied in practice. Nevertheless, it
provides an existing legal basis for addressing terraforming warfare. The key
elements, including knowledge, foreseeability, and excessiveness, are
particularly relevant where environmental destruction is not incidental but
systemic. In Gaza, the cumulative environmental impact of military operations
was not only foreseeable but widely documented. Continued operations in the
face of such knowledge raise serious questions about compliance with the Rome
Statute’s environmental war crime provision.

Moreover,
environmental destruction rarely occurs in isolation. It frequently overlaps
with other international crimes. The destruction of essential conditions
necessary for civilian survival may constitute crimes against humanity when
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian
population. In extreme instances, environmental destruction may also intersect
with genocidal conduct under Article 2(c) of the Genocide
Convention (1948), which prohibits the
deliberate infliction of conditions of life calculated to bring about the
physical destruction of a protected group. Recognising these overlaps does not
mean merging separate legal categories. Instead, it highlights the importance
of addressing environmental harm within current frameworks rather than treating
it as a marginal issue.

A Pragmatic (and Realistic) Path Forward

The
progressive movement advocating for the recognition of ecocide as a discrete
international crime reflects a legitimate dissatisfaction with the
anthropocentric limitations inherent in current legal frameworks. Environmental
damage is too frequently considered pertinent only insofar as it impacts human
interests, thereby neglecting the intrinsic value of ecosystems and non-human
life. Nonetheless, the
political and legal obstacles to amending
the Rome Statute remain substantial, rendering meaningful reform improbable in
the near term. Meanwhile, concentrating solely on future reforms may overlook
current harms. Terraforming warfare offers a practical alternative by viewing
environmental degradation as a core element of modern warfare. This concept
underscores the capacity of existing legal norms to address such issues. By
emphasising conduct patterns, knowledge, foreseeability, and cumulative damage,
terraforming warfare aligns with the frameworks of IHL and ICL, while
challenging their most restrictive interpretations. This approach does not
diminish the importance of ecocentric legal developments; rather, it aims to
bridge the divide between aspiration and implementation. Holding perpetrators
accountable for present environmental harm can fortify the normative
underpinnings necessary for more ambitious future reforms.

The destruction of Gaza’s environment serves as a warning rather than an anomaly. Modern warfare increasingly damages the ecological and material foundations that support civilian life, rendering environmental harm a core aspect of conflict rather than merely collateral damage. This shift, described as terraforming warfare, highlights the inadequacy of current legal frameworks in addressing the intentional transformation of the environment as a weapon. International law cannot ignore such harm or consider it marginal. The challenge is not the lack of relevant laws, but the reluctance to interpret and enforce them properly, given the scale, intent, and civilian impact involved. If international criminal law aims to truly protect humanity, it must equally safeguard the environments vital to human existence.