Case Explained: Supreme Court releases more decisions — but does not rule on Trump’s global tariffs – Legal Perspective

WASHINGTON (TNND) — The U.S. Supreme Court released three decisions on Tuesday morning — but did not rule on the legality of President Donald Trump’s global tariffs.

The court did not provide a timeline for its next rulings.

Trump on Saturday announced plans to impose a 10% import tax starting in February on goods from eight European nations because of their opposition to American control of Greenland.

In a post on Truth Social, Trump argued that the U.S. subsidized Denmark and much of the European Union “for many years” by not imposing tariffs, adding that it is now “time for Denmark to give back.”

The president also claimed China and Russia want Greenland and asserted that Denmark is incapable of defending the territory without U.S. involvement.

“World Peace is at stake! China and Russia want Greenland, and there is not a thing that Denmark can do about it,” Trump wrote.

“They currently have two dogsleds as protection, one added recently. Only the United States of America, under PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP, can play in this game, and very successfully, at that! Nobody will touch this sacred piece of Land, especially since the National Security of the United States, and the World at large, is at stake,” he added.

Supreme Court takes up conflict over state malpractice rules in federal court

The first of the three decisions included a case that could reshape how state-level medical malpractice requirements apply in federal courts, highlighting ongoing tension in federal civil procedure and “Erie doctrine” jurisprudence.

The case, Berk v. Choy, stems from a lawsuit filed by Harold R. Berk, who was hurt in Delaware and later sued three healthcare providers for alleged medical negligence in federal court. Under Delaware law, plaintiffs bringing medical malpractice claims must submit an affidavit of merit — a sworn statement from a qualified medical expert asserting that the case has a reasonable basis — along with their complaint.

Berk, representing himself, did not include such an affidavit and instead submitted his medical records. A federal district court in Delaware dismissed his case, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the dismissal, concluding that the Delaware affidavit-of-merit requirement must be enforced in federal court when state law governs the cause of action and is considered substantive.

At issue before the Supreme Court is a longstanding and complex question in civil procedure: Should federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction enforce a state statute’s affidavit-of-merit requirement that effectively dictates when a complaint must be dismissed unless accompanied by expert support?

While the justices have not yet released a decision, the case is expected to have significant implications for medical malpractice litigation and other areas where state procedural requirements intersect with federal rules. It could affect how easily plaintiffs can bring claims in federal court and how state tort reform measures operate beyond state-court walls.

Retroactive restitution and the Ex Post Facto Clause

The Supreme Court, meanwhile, is weighing a constitutional challenge to how long federal criminal restitution orders can be enforced under a law enacted after a defendant’s crime, a case that could reshape restitution obligations for thousands of former offenders nationwide.

In Holsey Ellingburg, Jr. v. United States, the justices are considering whether restitution ordered under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA) counts as criminal punishment for purposes of the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause, which prohibits Congress from retroactively increasing the legal penalties attached to a crime.

Holsey Ellingburg, Jr. was convicted in 1996 of bank robbery and a related gun offense. At sentencing, a federal judge ordered him to pay more than $7,500 in restitution to his victims. At the time, restitution obligations under the earlier Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA) expired 20 years after sentencing.

However, after Ellingburg’s conviction, Congress replaced the VWPA with the MVRA, extending the repayment period so that restitution could be enforced up to 20 years after a defendant’s release from prison, and requiring mandatory interest. Under the updated law, the government continued to collect restitution from Ellingburg long after his release, nearly doubling the total amount owed.

Ellingburg challenged the continued enforcement, arguing that applying the MVRA retroactively increased his punishment in violation of the Constitution’s ban on ex post facto laws. The federal district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected that argument, with the Eighth Circuit ruling that restitution under the MVRA is a civil remedy rather than a criminal punishment and therefore not subject to the constitutional protection.

The Supreme Court granted review to clarify whether restitution under the MVRA is truly penal in nature and therefore protected by the Ex Post Facto Clause. Ellingburg and his supporters argue that because restitution is imposed only after a criminal conviction, enforced through criminal procedures, and tied to punishment concepts like deterrence, it should be treated as part of the criminal sentence.

The federal government, which surprisingly declined to defend the lower court’s ruling, supports Ellingburg’s position that MVRA restitution is punitive. However, the government also asked the Court to remand the case for the lower court to apply the correct legal standard. A court-appointed amicus lawyer, representing the judgment, counters that restitution under the MVRA was intended as a civil remedy focused on victim compensation, not punishment, and thus should not trigger ex post facto analysis.

If restitution under the MVRA is deemed punitive, former offenders nationwide may be able to limit the government’s ability to pursue payment beyond the original statutory period that existed at the time of their crimes. A decision is expected later this term.

Supreme Court hears case on time limits for vacating void judgments

The Supreme Court is also considering a case that could resolve a longstanding split among federal courts over whether a party must file a motion to vacate a void judgment within a “reasonable time,” or whether there is effectively no deadline when a judgment is void for lack of personal jurisdiction.

In Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton, the Supreme Court considered how the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply when a judgment is void because a court lacked personal jurisdiction over a defendant. The case was argued last fall.

One rule allows a party to ask a court to set aside a judgment that is void, while another generally requires such motions to be filed within a reasonable time. The question before the justices is whether that time limit applies to all void judgments — including those entered without personal jurisdiction — or whether such judgments may be challenged at any time.

Most federal appeals courts have held there is effectively no time limit for challenging a void judgment that was entered without personal jurisdiction, reasoning that a void judgment is legally a nullity from the start. The Sixth Circuit in the case was the outlier, holding that the reasonable-time requirement applies, meaning defendants must act promptly or lose the right to seek relief.

Attorneys for Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. urged the justices to rule that applying a time limit to motions to vacate void judgments encourages gamesmanship and unfairness. They argued that a person who was never properly subject to a court’s jurisdiction should not be bound by a judgment that was void from the outset simply because they missed an arbitrary deadline.

The trustee — responding for Jeanne Ann Burton, Chapter 7 trustee for Vista-Pro Automotive, LLC — defended the Sixth Circuit’s approach, asserting that the “reasonable time” requirement appropriately balances the need to challenge improper judgments with the need for finality in litigation. Opposing briefs also contend that without timing limits, defendants could delay indefinitely, creating instability and prejudice for plaintiffs.

The Supreme Court’s decision could have wide implications for civil litigation, particularly in jurisdictional disputes and default judgments. If the Court rules that there is no time limit on void-judgment motions, parties could seek relief in old cases long after they believed a matter was settled. Conversely, upholding a time limit could reinforce procedural predictability — but leave some without a meaningful remedy when jurisdictional defects arise.

The question also touches on basic notions of due process. A judgment rendered by a court that never had authority over a defendant, critics argue, should be treated as legally nonexistent — not subject to bureaucratic time bars.

Supporters of the time limit emphasize the importance of finality and preventing endless litigation.

The Supreme Court has not yet announced when it will issue its ruling in the case. Like other decisions, the Court does not typically release its opinions in advance or announce which cases will be decided on a given day.