Explained : India’s Strategic Posture and Bangladesh’s Moment of Autonomy and Its Impact

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India likes to speak the language of statecraft, invoking history, strategy, and responsibility in the region. Yet the way New Delhi behaves toward Bangladesh today reveals something altogether more ambivalent – a strange combination of overbearing influence and political insecurity, wrapped in the rhetoric of strategic wisdom. The dissonance is growing louder, and Dhaka is no longer inclined to pretend otherwise.

What makes the moment so striking is the gap between India’s declared ideals and its conduct. New Delhi insists it wants democratic legitimacy across its borders. It argues that security, stability and orderly politics in Bangladesh are essential for regional peace. But at the same time, political figures with a documented record of authoritarianism and destabilizing behavior continue to find voice and amplification through Indian media ecosystems and partisan networks. Elements that once presided over repression are suddenly celebrated as exiles of conscience. When such actors use Indian platforms to cast a shadow over Bangladesh’s political future, it is not merely commentary it becomes complicity.

India may well claim this posture as prudent statecraft, drawing implicitly on the legacy of Chanakya Niti—the Arthashastra’s pragmatic, unsentimental view of power. However, this practice does not align with the underlying principle. Chanakya’s counsel was not crude opportunism; it was calibrated realism: understand context, respect strength, avoid needless provocation, and know when restraint delivers more than coercion. In the Bangladesh case, India appears to have adopted only the rhetoric of strategy, not its discipline. Influence is pursued through pressure, selective indignation, and psychological signaling as if Dhaka remains a passive periphery to be managed rather than a sovereign actor to be respected.

This habit of mixed messaging is visible beyond politics. New Delhi justifies military build-ups around the Siliguri corridor, forward positioning near the border, and a palpable tightening of security rhetoric as defensive necessities. Indeed, these measures may address India’s concerns. Yet, when paired with media narratives that question Bangladesh’s choices and folded into the theatre of Indian domestic politics, these measures take on a different meaning. They begin to look less like deterrence and more like leverage. And leverage is remembered.

Compounding the problem is India’s tendency to instrumentalize its neighbors for internal political consumption. Public attention repeatedly shifts outward instead of sustained, difficult conversations about unemployment, inequality, climate vulnerability, or democratic backsliding at home. Bangladesh becomes a talking point. Parliamentary interventions and campaign speeches turn regional relationships into rhetorical tools. The familiar pattern dramatization, securitization, and externalization echoes what India has long done with Pakistan, China, and, when convenient, the West. The difference now is that Bangladesh has changed.

The Bangladesh of today is not a silent adjunct to Indian politics. It is a country seeking strategic autonomy, building multiple partnerships, and negotiating its place in a more complex world. India assumes it can continue to dictate the tempo politically, diplomatically, or psychologically, but this belief belongs to an earlier era. Attempts to recycle divide-and-rule narratives, particularly where they intersect with identity politics and West Bengal’s electoral theatre, not only risk miscalculation; they actively corrode trust.

Chanakya himself warned against mistaking proximity for control. Neighborhoods are not fixed assets. They engage in politics while considering their memory, dignity, and agency. A state that forces its presence upon them may gain a short-term advantage but will eventually forfeit goodwill. India needs to understand the distinction between being a regional leader and a regional manager.

The pragmatic path is clear. India should align its language with its behavior, cease treating Bangladesh as a prop in domestic contests, and abandon the double game of endorsing elections while enabling voices that destabilize them. Respectful diplomacy costs less than coercive theatre. Strategic patience means more than constant signaling. And moral credibility cannot be asserted; it must be lived.

Bangladesh, for its part, does not ask for indulgence. It asks for recognition that the political landscape has evolved, that sovereignty is not negotiable, and that partnership cannot be built on veiled pressure. The coming years will test whether New Delhi can move beyond reflexive paternalism towards a steadier, more honest relationship.

The tightrope, then, is not that of Bangladesh; it is India’s. India finds itself balancing between ancient theory and modern practice, navigating the dualities of ambition and insecurity, as well as leadership and interference. How India chooses to resolve this tension will be pivotal in determining whether South Asia progresses towards cooperative stability or if mistrust emerges as the region’s prevailing strategic language.

 

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